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Abstract. Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in eco-
nomics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for
two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act strategically. For two-sided markets, an impossibility
result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that no mechanism can simultaneously satisfy individual
rationality (IR), incentive compatibility (IC), strong budget-balance (SBB), and be efficient. Follow-up
work mostly focused on designing mechanisms that trade off among these properties, in settings where
there exists one single type of items for sale, the buyers ask for one unit of the items, and the sellers
initially hold one unit of the item.
On the other hand, important applications to web advertisement, stock exchange, and frequency spec-
trum allocation, require us to consider two-sided combinatorial auctions in which buyers have prefer-
ences on subsets of items, and sellers may offer multiple heterogeneous items. No efficient mechanism
was known so far for such two-sided combinatorial markets. This work provides the first IR, IC and SBB
mechanisms that provides an O(1)-approximation to the optimal social welfare for two-sided markets.
An initial construction yields such a mechanism, but exposes a conceptual problem in the traditional
SBB notion. This leads us to define the stronger notion of direct trade strong budget balance (DSBB).
We then proceed to design mechanisms that are IR, IC, DSBB, and again provide anO(1)-approximation
to the optimal social welfare. Our mechanisms work for any number of buyers with XOS valuations
– a class in between submodular and subadditive functions – and any number of sellers. We provide
a mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if the sellers each have one item
for sale, and one that is bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if sellers hold multiple items and have
additive valuations over them. Finally, we present a DSIC mechanism for the case that the valuation
functions of all buyers and sellers are additive. We prove our main results by showing that there exists
a variant of a sequential posted price mechanism, generalised to two-sided combinatorial markets, that
achieves the desired goals.
1 Introduction
One-sided markets have been studied in economics for several decades and more recently in com-
puter science. Mechanism Design in one-sided markets aims to find an efficient (high-welfare) allo-
cation of a set of items to a set of agents, while ensuring that truthfully reporting the input data
is the best strategy for the agents. The cornerstone method in mechanism design is the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [22, 4, 12] that optimizes the social welfare of the agents while
providing the right incentives for truth-telling: VCG mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC), and in many mechanism design settings, VCG is also individually rational
(IR). IR requires that participating in the mechanism is beneficial to each agent. DSIC requires
that truthfully reporting one’s preferences to the mechanism is a dominant strategy for each agent,
independently of what the other agents report.
Recently, increased attention has been on the problems that arise in two-sided markets, in which
the set of agents is partitioned into buyers and sellers. As opposed to the one-sided setting (where
one could say that the mechanism itself initially holds the items), in the two-sided setting the items
are initially held by the set of sellers, who express valuations over the items they hold, and who are
assumed to act rationally and strategically. The mechanism’s task is now to decide which buyers
and sellers should trade, and at which prices. There is a growing interest in two-sided markets
that can be attributed to various important applications. Examples range from selling display-ads
on ad exchange platforms, the US FCC spectrum license reallocation, and stock exchanges. Two-
sided markets are usually studied in a Bayesian setting: there is public knowledge of probability
distributions, one for each buyer and one for each seller, from which the valuations of the buyers
and sellers are drawn.
In two-sided markets, a further important requirement is strong budget-balance (SBB), which
states that monetary transfers happen only among the agents in the market, i.e., the buyers and
the sellers are allowed to trade without leaving to the mechanism any share of the payments, and
without the mechanism adding money into the market. A weaker version of SBB often considered
in the literature is weak budget-balance (WBB), which only requires the mechanism not to inject
money into the market.
Unfortunately, Myerson and Satterthwaite [16] proved that it is impossible for an IR, Bayesian
incentive compatible (BIC),6 and WBB mechanism to maximize social welfare in such a market,
even in the bilateral trade setting, i.e., when there is just one seller and one buyer.7
Despite the numerous above mentioned practical contexts that need the application of combi-
natorial two-sided market mechanisms, we are not aware of any mechanism that approximates the
social welfare while meeting the IR, IC and SBB requirements. The purpose of this paper is to pro-
vide mechanisms that satisfy these requirements and achieve an O(1)-approximation to the social
welfare for a broad class of agents’ valuation functions. We do, in fact, design mechanisms that
work under the assumption of the valuations being fractionally subadditive (XOS), a generalisation
of submodular functions that are contained in the class of subadditive functions.
Our work builds upon previous work on an important special case of a two-sided market that
is the one in which each seller holds a single item, items are identical, and each agent is only
interested in holding a single item. In this setting, the valuations of the agents are thus given by
a single number, representing the agent’s appreciation for holding an item. A mechanism for this
6 Bayesian incentive compatibility is a form of incentive compatibility that is less restrictive than DSIC. It only
requires that reporting truthfully is in expectation the best strategy for a player when everyone else also does so,
i.e., truthful reporting is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
7 The VCG mechanism can also be applied to two-sided markets; however, in this setting, VCG is either not IR or
it does not satisfy WBB.
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setting is known in the literature as a double auction. The goal of several works on double auctions
[14, 19, 20] has been that of trading off the achievable social welfare with the strength of the
incentive compatibility and budget balance constraints. A recent work addressed the problem of
approximating social welfare in double auctions and related problems under the WBB requirement.
Du¨tting, Talgam-Cohen, and Roughgarden [9] indeed proposed a greedy strategy that combines the
one-sided VCG mechanism, independently applied to buyers and to sellers with the trade-reduction
mechanism of McAfee [14]. They obtain IR, DSIC, WBB mechanisms with a good approximation
of the social welfare, for knapsack, matching and matroid allocation constraints. More recently,
Colini-Baldeschi et al. [5] presented the first double auction that satisfies IR, DSIC, and SBB, and
approximates the optimal (expected) social welfare up to a constant factor. These results hold
for any number of buyers and sellers with arbitrary, independent distributions on valuations. The
mechanisms are also extended to the setting where there is an additional matroid constraint on the
set of buyers who can purchase an item.
1.1 The Model
As stated above, the set of agents is partitioned into a set of sellers, each of which is initially
endowed with a set of heterogeneous items, and a set of buyers, having no items initially. Buyers
have money that can be used to pay for items. Every agent has its own, private valuation function,
which maps subsets of the items to numbers, and agents are assumed to optimize their (quasi-
linear) utility, which is given by the valuation of the set of items that the mechanism allocates to
the agents, minus the payment that the mechanism asks from the agents. A seller will typically
receive money instead of pay money, which we model by a negative payment.
For each agent we are given a (publicly known) probability distribution over a set of valuation
functions, from which we assume her valuation function is drawn. The mechanism and the other
agents have no knowledge of the actual valuation function of the i-th agent, but only of her proba-
bility distribution. The general aim of the mechanism is to reallocate the items so as to maximize
the expected social welfare (the sum of the agents’ valuations of the resulting allocation).
Let OPT be the expected social welfare of an optimal allocation of the items. Note that this is a
well-defined quantity, even though computing an optimal allocation may be computationally hard,
and even though there might not exist an appropriate mechanism that is guaranteed to always
output an optimal allocation.
We are interested in mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality (IR), dominant strategy
incentive compatibility (DSIC) (or failing that, the weaker notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility
(BIC)), and strong budget-balance (SBB), and that reallocate the items in such a way that the
expected social welfare is within some constant fraction of OPT, where expectation is taken over the
given probability distributions of the agents’ valuations, and over the randomness of the allocation
that the mechanism outputs. The obstacle of interest to us is not the computational one, but the
requirement of achieving mechanisms with such approximation guarantees, that are also DSIC,
IR, and SBB. The main focus of this paper is the existence of mechanisms that obtain a constant
approximation to the optimal social welfare and not the computational issues related to them.
We remark, however, that our mechanisms can be implemented in polynomial time at the cost of
an additional welfare loss of a factor c, where c is the best-known approximation factor for the
problem of optimising buyers’ social welfare, if both a poly-time approximation algorithm and an
approximation for the query oracle exist (see e.g., [10]).
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1.2 Overview of the Results
The present paper starts off by showing that there is a straightforward trick that one may apply
to turn any WBB mechanism into an SBB one, with a small loss in approximation factor. The
technique is to pre-select one random agent that is taken out of the market a priori whose role is
to receive all leftover money, and it can be applied in order to obtain from [1] a O(1)-approximate
DSIC, IR, and SBB mechanism for a very broad class of markets. This therefore demonstrates
a weakness in the current notion of SBB, which motivates the introduction of the strengthened
notion direct trade strong budget balance (DSBB), that requires that a monetary transfer between
two agents in the market is only possible in case the agents trade items.
The goal of our proposed mechanisms is twofold: (i) achieve a constant approximation to the
optimal social welfare, and (ii) design mechanisms that respect the stronger notion of DSBB. Note
that with non-unit-supply sellers, a constant approximation is not known even in the context of
WBB or standard SBB.8 We present the following mechanisms:
– A 6-approximate DSIC mechanism for buyers with XOS-valuations and sellers with one item
at their disposal (i.e., unit-supply sellers);
– a 6-approximate BIC mechanism for buyers with XOS-valuations and non-unit supply sellers
with additive valuations;
– a 6-approximate DSIC mechanism for buyers with additive valuations and sellers with additive
valuations.
XOS functions lie in between the class of monotone submodular functions and subadditive functions
in terms of generality. Additive and XOS functions are frequently used in the mechanism design
literature. To our knowledge, these are the first mechanisms for these two-sided market settings that
are simultaneously incentive compatible, (D)SBB, IR, and approximate the optimal social welfare
to within a constant factor.
A first ingredient needed to obtain our results is the extension of two-sided sequential posted
price mechanisms (SPMs) [5] for double auctions to two-sided markets. SPMs are a particularly
elegant and well-studied class of mechanisms for one-sided markets. All the presented SPMs do not
require any assumption on the arrival order of the agents. A second ingredient of our result is to
use the expected marginal contribution of an item to the social welfare as the price of the item in a
sequential posted price mechanism for buyers with XOS valuations [10].
1.3 Related Work
Due to the impossibility result of [16], no two-sided mechanism can simultaneously satisfy BIC, IR,
WBB and be socially efficient, even in the simple bilateral trade setting. Follow-up work thus had
to focus on designing mechanisms that trade off among these properties.
Some paper of the Economics literature studied the convergence rate to social efficiency as
a function of the number of agents when all sellers’ and buyers’ valuations are independently
respectively drawn from identical regular distributions, while satisfying IR and WBB. Gresik and
Satterthwaite [11] showed that duplicating the number of agents by τ results in a market where
the optimal IR, IC, WBB mechanism’s inefficiency goes down as a function of O(log τ/τ2). [17, 20]
investigated a family of non-truthful double auction mechanisms, parameterized by a value c ∈
[0, 1]. We remark that the results mentioned above only hold for unit-demand buyers and unit-
supply sellers, identical valuation distributions, and the hidden constants in these asymptotic result
8 The mechanism proposed in [1] achieves a constant approximation if the size of the initial endowment of each
agent is bounded by a constant. Otherwise the mechanism achieves a logarithmic approximation to the optimal
social welfare.
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depend on the particular distribution. In contrast, our interest is in finding universal constant
approximation guarantees for combinatorial settings.
In McAfee [14], an IC, WBB, IR double auction is proposed that extracts at least a (1 − 1/ℓ)
fraction of the maximum social welfare, where ℓ is the number of traders in the optimal solution.
Optimal revenue-maximizing Bayesian auctions were characterized in [15], which provides an
elegant tool applicable to single-parameter, one-sided auctions. Various subsequent articles dealt
with extending these results. Related to our work is [6], which studied maximizing the auctioneer’s
revenue in Bayesian double auctions. The same objective was studied in [7] yet in the prior-free
model. Recently, Du¨tting et al. [9] provided black-box reductions from WBB double auctions to
one-sided mechanisms. They are for a prior-free setting and can be applied with matroid, knapsack,
and matching feasibility constraints on the allocations. More recently, [5] presented the first IR, IC
and SBB mechanism for double auctions that O(1)-approximates the optimal social welfare. In [21],
mechanisms for some special cases of two-sided markets are presented that work by a combination
of random sampling and random serial dictatorship. The mechanism is IR, SBB and DSIC and its
gain from trade approaches the optimum when the market is sufficiently large. Mechanisms that
are IC, IR, and SBB have been given for bilateral trade in [1]. In addition to this, the authors
proposed a WBB mechanism for a general class of combinatorial exchange markets. We will use
this result to construct our initial mechanism.
Sequential posted price mechanisms (SPMs) in one-sided markets have been introduced in [18]
and have since gained attention due to their simplicity, robustness to collusion, and their easy
implementability in practical applications. One of the first theoretical results concerning SPMs is
an asymptotic comparison among three different types of single-parameter mechanisms [2]. They
were later studied for the objective of revenue maximisation in [3]. Additionally, [13, 8] strengthen
these results further. Very relevant to our work is the paper of Feldman et al. [10] showing that
sequential posted price mechanisms can approximate social welfare up to a constant factor of 1/2
for XOS valuation functions if the published price for an item is equal to the expected additive
contribution of the item to the social welfare.
2 Preliminaries
As a general convention, we use boldface notation for vectors and use [a] to denote the set {1, . . . , a}.
We will use I(X) to denote the indicator function that maps to 1 if and only if event/fact X holds.
Markets. A two-sided market comprises a set of two distinct types of agents: the sellers, who
initially hold items for sale, and the buyers, who are interested in buying the sellers’ items. All
agents possess a monotone and normalized valuation function, mapping subsets of items to R≥0.
9
Formally, we represent a two-sided market as a tuple (n,m, k, I,G,F ), where [n] denotes the set of
buyers, [m] denotes the set of sellers, [k] denotes the set of all items for sale, I := (I1, . . . , Im) is a
vector of (mutually disjoint) sets of items initially held by each seller, called the initial endowment,
where it holds that
⋃m
j=1 Ij = [k]. Vectors G = (G1, . . . , Gn) and F = (F1, . . . , Fm) are vectors of
probability distributions, from which the buyers’ and sellers’ valuation functions are assumed to be
drawn. A (combinatorial) exchange market is a more general version of the above defined two-sided
market where an agent can act as both a buyer and a seller. Thus, everyone may initially own
items and may both sell and buy items As a result, in this setting, we override the notation and
simply use n to denote the total number of agents. Formally, an exchange market is thus a tuple
(n, k, I,F ).
9 By monotone we mean that getting more items cannot decrease an agent’s overall valuation, and with normalized
we mean that the empty set is mapped to 0.
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In two-sided markets sellers are assumed to only value items in their initial bundle and are
therefore not interested in buying from other sellers, i.e., ∀j ∈ [m] and ∀S ⊆ [k], wj(S) = wj(S∩Ij).
On the contrary, in exchange markets, no such restriction on the valuation functions exists.
Throughout the paper, we reserve the usage of the letter i to denote a single buyer, the letter
j to denote a single seller, and the letter ℓ to denote a single item. Moreover, we use vi to denote
buyer i’s valuation function and wj to denote seller j’s valuation function.
Mechanism Design Goals. In order to avoid overloading this section, the following content will
only be described for two-sided markets (which are the main focus of the paper). Nonetheless, any
of the subsequent concepts can naturally be extended to combinatorial exchange markets.
Given a two-sided market, our aim is to redistribute the items among the agents so as to
maximize the social welfare (the sum of the agents’ valuations). An allocation for a given two-sided
market (n,m, k, I,G,F ) is a pair of vectors (X,Y ) = ((X1, . . . ,Xn), (Y1, . . . , Ym)) such that the
union of X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . Ym is [k], and X1, . . . Xn, Y1, . . . , Ym are mutually non-intersecting.
Redistribution of the items is done by running a mechanism M. A mechanism interacts with
and receives input from the buyers, and outputs an outcome, consisting of an allocation (X,Y )
and a payment vector (ρB ,ρS) ∈ Rn ×Rm, where ρB refers to the buyers’ vector of payments and
ρS to the sellers’ one. The outcome of a mechanism M is represented by a tuple (X,Y ,ρB,ρS).
Agents are assumed to maximize their utility, which is defined as the valuation for the bundle
of items that they get allocated, minus the payment charged by the mechanism. In particular, the
utility uBi (vi, (X,Y ,ρ
B,ρS)) of a buyer i ∈ [n] is vi(Xi) − ρ
B
i , whereas for a seller j ∈ [m] it is
uSj (wj , (X,Y ,ρ
B,ρS)) = wj(Yj)− ρ
S
j .
Since agents are assumed to maximize their utility, they will strategically interact with the
mechanism so as to achieve this. Our goal is to design mechanism such that there is a dominant
strategy or Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the agents under which the mechanism returns an allocation
with a high social welfare. For a allocation (X,Y ), the social welfare SW(X,Y ) is defined as
SW(X,Y ) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi) +
∑
j∈[m]wj(Yj).
The objective function we want to maximize is the above defined social welfare. We now describe
three main constraints our mechanisms must adhere to. For each of these constraints we first
introduce the strictest version and then a more relaxed one. Our mechanisms aim to satisfy the
strictest versions, whenever possible.
– Dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC): It is a dominant strategy for every agent to
report her true valuation sincerely, no matter what the others do, i.e., no agent can increase
her utility by misreporting her true valuation.
– Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC): No agent can obtain a gain in her expected utility by
declaring a valuation different from her true one, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the
others’ valuations.10
– Ex-post individual rationality (ex-post IR): It is not harmful for any agent to participate in
the mechanism, i.e., there is guaranteed to be a strategy for an agent that yields the agent an
increase in utility.
– Interim individual rationality (interim IR): There is a strategy for each agent that yields her
an expected increase in utility (where expectation is over the valuations of the other agents and
the internal randomness of the mechanism).
10 Technically, as can be inferred, the DSIC properties are reserved for direct revelation mechansims, i.e., where the
buyer solely interacts with the mechanism by reporting his valuation function. It is well-known that mechanisms
admitting a dominant strategy can be transformed into DSIC direct revelation mechanisms, and those with a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be transformed into BIC direct revelation mechanisms. This way, we extend the DSIC
and BIC definitions to non-direct revelation mechanisms.
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– Strong Budget Balance (SBB): The sum of all agents’ payments output by the mechanism is
equal to zero. Conceptually, this means that no money is burnt or ends up at an external party,
and no external party needs to subsidise the mechanism.
– Weak Budget Balance (WBB): The sum of all payments is at least zero. In two sided-markets
this translates in having the buyers’ payments being at least as large as the payments received
by the sellers.
For valuation profiles (v,w), OPT(v,w) := maxX,Y {SW(X,Y )} denotes the optimal social
welfare, where the max goes over all feasible allocations X,Y . The expected optimal social welfare
is the value OPT = Ev,w[OPT(v,w)]. We say that a mechanism M α-approximates the optimal
social welfare for some α > 1 iff OPT ≤ αEv,w[SW(M(v,w))]. Our goal is to find mechanisms that
α-approximates the optimal social welfare for a low α, are DSIC or BIC, SBB, and ex-post IR or
interim IR.
Classes of Valuation Functions. We will consider probability distributions over the following
classes of valuation functions. Let v : 2[k] → R≥0 be a valuation function. Then,
– v is additive iff there exists numbers α1, . . . αk ∈ R≥0 such that v(S) =
∑
j∈S αj for all S ⊆ [k].
– v is fractionally subadditive (or XOS) iff there exists a collection of additive functions a1, . . . , ad
such that for every bundle S ⊆ [k] it holds that v(S) = maxi∈[d] ai(S).
It is easy to see that every additive function is a XOS function. Further, it is well-known that the
class of submodular functions are contained in the class of XOS functions. Due to space constraints,
all proofs in the remainder of this paper have been deferred to the appendix.
3 An Initial Mechanism and Direct Trade Strong Budget Balance
In [1], Blumrosen and Dobzinski present a mechanism for exchange markets with subadditive val-
uation functions. They prove the following for this mechanism, which we name Mbd.
Theorem 3.1 (Blumrosen and Dobzinski [1]). Mechanism Mbd is a DSIC, WBB, ex-post
IR randomized direct revelation mechanism that 4H(s)-approximates the optimal social welfare
for combinatorial exchange markets (n, k, I,F ) with subadditive valuation functions, where s =
min{n, |Ii| : i ∈ [n]} is the minimum of the number of agents and the number of items in an agent’s
initial endowment, and H(·) denotes the harmonic numbers.
In particular, this mechanism gives us a constant approximation factor if the number of starting
items of the agents is bounded by a constant.
Now consider a mechanism Msbb that selects an agent i ∈ [n] uniformly at random, runs Mbd
on the remaining agents, and allocates the surplus money of Mbd to agent i. We then are able to
proof the following.
Theorem 3.2. Mechanism Msbb is DSIC, ex-post IR, SBB, and achieves an 8nH(s)/(n − 1)-
approximation to the optimal social welfare for exchange markets with subadditive valuations and
at least 3 agents.11
The proof and a more precise description of Msbb are provided in Appendix A. This yields an ex-
post IR, SBB, DSIC mechanism that O(1)-approximates the social welfare if the number of items
initially posessed by an agent is bounded by a constant. The principle that we used to construct
Mechanism Msbb can more generally be used to turn any WBB mechanism into a SBB one, while
11 For 2 agents, it is straightforward to come up with alternative mechanisms that have the desired properties.
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preserving the DSIC and ex-post IR properties. It also reveals a problematic aspect of the notion of
SBB: it allows for agents to receive money, while they are not involved in any trade. This motivates
a strengthened notion of strong budget balance, which we call direct trade strong budget balance.
Definition 3.1. A mechanism for an exchange market satisfies direct trade strong budget balance
(DSBB) iff the outcome it generates can be achieved by a set of bilateral trades, where each trade
consists of a reallocation of an item from an agent i to an agent j, and a monetary transfer from
agent j to agent i. Moreover, each item may only be traded once.
It can be seen that Mechanism Msbb does not satisfy DSBB. In the remainder of the paper we will
proceed to design mechanisms for two-sided markets that do satisfy DSBB.12 Moreover, two of our
results provide an O(1)-approximation even in settings in which theMsbb provides only a log-factor.
4 A Mechanism for Unit-Supply Two-Sided Markets with XOS Buyers
In this section we present a DSIC, ex-post IR, and DSBB mechanism for unit supply two-sided mar-
kets, when buyers have XOS valuation functions. This mechanism achieves constant approximation
to the optimal social welfare. This result extends [10] to two-sided auctions and [5] to a setting in
which buyers have combinatorial preferences over the items. In unit-supply two-sided markets, for
simplicity, we use [k] to denote to both the set of items and the set of sellers, where item j is owned
by seller j (so Ij = {j} for all j ∈ [k]). For each seller j ∈ [k], we then treat Fj as a distribution
over R≥0 instead of a distribution over functions.
We assume throughout this section that (n, k, k, I,G,F ) is a given unit-supply two-sided mar-
ket, on which we run the mechanism to be defined. For an allocation (X,Y ) ∈ A, we shall use
the superscripts SWB ,SWS to respectively denote the buyers’ and the sellers’ contribution to the
social welfare, i.e.,
SW
B(X,Y ) :=
n∑
i=1
vi(Xi), and SW
S(X,Y ) :=
k∑
j=1
wjI [j ∈ Yj] .
Our mechanism will work by specifying prices on the items in the market. For a bundle Λ and
an item price vector p = (p1, . . . , pk), we define the demand correspondence of buyer i ∈ [n] with
valuation function vi as
D(vi,p, Λ) :=

S ⊆ Λ : vi(S)−
∑
j∈S
pj ≥ vi(T )−
∑
j∈T
pj for all T ⊆ Λ

 ,
i.e., the set of bundles of items in Λ that maximize i’s utility under the given item prices, when she
has valuation function vi.
For a buyer i with valuation function vi, we define the additive representative function for
bundle T ⊆ [k] as the additive function a(vi, T, ·) : 2
[k] → R≥0 such that vi(T ) = a(vi, T, T ), and
vi(S) ≥ a(vi, T, S) for all S ⊆ [k] . The additive representative function of a bundle is guaranteed
to exist for each buyer i, for each valuation function in the support of Fi, by the definition of XOS
functions.
Mechanism. Let A be an algorithm that, given a valuation profile of the buyers v, allocates the
items [k] to them, and does not take into account the sellers and their valuations. Our mechanism
will use such an algorithm as a black-box, and it can be thought of as outputting either an allocation
12 We note that the double auctions given in [5] also satisfy the DSBB property.
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that is optimal for the buyers (in case one does not care about the runtime of the mechanism) or
an approximately optimal one (in case one insists on the mechanism running in polynomial time).
Let Xall(v) = (Xall1 (v), . . . ,X
all
n (v)) be the output allocation of A(v). Let SW(X
all(v)) be the
total social welfare of the allocation Xall(v).
We define for each item j ∈ [k] its contribution SWBj (v) to the social welfare SW(X
all(v))
as follows: If there exists a player i that receives item j in allocation Xalli (v), then SW
B
j (v) =
a(vi,X
all
i (v), {j}). Otherwise, if j is not allocated to any buyer in X
all
i (v), then SW
B
j (v) = 0.
This notion allows us to make a distinction between high welfare items and low welfare items.
An item j ∈ [k] is said to have high welfare with respect to SW(Xalli (v)) iff Ev[SW
B
j (v)] ≥ 4E [wj],
i.e., the expected social welfare contribution of j if we would allocate j according to Xall(v) is at
least four times as high as the social welfare that results from leaving item j at its seller.
Formally, let L be the set of high welfare items, i.e., L :=
{
ℓ ∈ [k] : E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v
]
≥ 4E [wj ]
}
, and
let L¯ be the set of low welfare items, i.e. L¯ := [k] \ L. For each high welfare item j ∈ L, the
mechanism makes use of the following associated item price pj :
pj :=
1
2
Ev
[
SW
B
j (v)
]
.
Observe that pj ≥ 2E[wj ] for all j ∈ L, by our definition of high welfare items. The reason why L
is chosen in such a way is twofold: first, the items in L¯ if kept by their sellers provide a welfare loss
of at most a constant factor; second, every item in L is guaranteed to be sold (if sold) at a high
price.
Our (randomized) mechanism does the following simple procedure. First, it goes to every seller
in L (in any order) and asks each of them whether they would sell their item for a price of pj. As
mentioned above, by definition of the prices, every seller j ∈ L accepts the price with probability
at least 1/2 because of Markov’s inequality. To make sure that this probability is exactly 1/2, the
seller j is only given the opportunity to sell her item at the price pj with probability qj such that
(in expectation) the offer is accepted with probability exactly 1/2. Formally, the mechanism makes
an offer to the seller j with probability
qj :=
1
2Fj(pj)
, where Fj(pj) = Pr [wj ≤ pj] .
Once we have gone through every seller and know which items are in the market, we move to
the buyers and ask each (in any order) for their favorite bundle according to the items currently
available for purchase.
We call the mechanism sketched above M1-supply, which we will now present more precisely:
1. Let L := {j ∈ [k] : Ev[SW
B
j (v)] ≥ 4E[wj ]}.
2. For all j ∈ L, set pj :=
1
2
Ev
[
SW
B
j (v)
]
.
3. Let Λ1 := ∅, Xi := ∅ for all i ∈ [n] and Yj := {j} for all j ∈ [k].
4. For all j ∈ L:
(a) Set qj := 1/(2Pr[wj ≤ pj ]).
(b) With probability qj , offer payment pj in exchange for her item. Otherwise, skip this seller.
(c) If j accepts the offer, set Λ1 := Λ1 ∪ {j}.
5. For all i ∈ [n]:
(a) Buyer i chooses a bundle Bi ∈ D(vi,p, Λi) that maximizes her utility.
(b) Allocate the accepted items to buyer i, i.e., Xi := Bi and Yj := ∅ for all j ∈ Bi.
(c) Remove the selected items from the available items, i.e., Λi+1 := Λi \Bi.
6. Return the outcome consisting of allocation (X = (X1, . . . , Xn),Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk)) and payments ρ = (ρ
B,ρS),
where ρBi =
∑
j∈Xi
pj for i ∈ [n] and ρ
S
j = −pjI [Yj = ∅] for j ∈ [k].
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Note that Algorithm A is used in the first steps of mechanism M1-supply, where Ev[SW
B
j (v)] is com-
puted. Let α be the factor by which A is guaranteed to approximate the social welfare of the
buyers.
Theorem 4.1. M1-supply is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB, and (2+4α)-approximates the optimal social
welfare.
In particular, taking for A an optimal algorithm (i.e., α = 1), we obtain that there exists a mecha-
nism that is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB, and 6-approximates the optimal social welfare. Alternatively,
one may take for A an approximation algorithm in order to obtain polynomial time implementable
mechanisms, as explained in further detail in [10].
5 A Mechanism for Two-Sided Markets with XOS Buyers and Additive Sellers
We now consider the setting in which sellers may own multiple distinct items and have an additive
valuation function over them. We design a DSBB mechanism that is DSIC and ex-post IR on the
sellers’ side, and BIC and interim IR on the buyers’ side. At the end of the section also proof that
in the case of both buyers and sellers possessing additive valuation functions, the mechanism we
present is DSIC and ex-post IR on both sides of the market.
We assume throughout this section that (n,m, k, I,G,F ) is a given two-sided market with XOS
buyers and Additive Sellers, on which we run the mechanism to be defined. Like in the previous
section, the buyers are still assumed to have XOS valuation functions over the items. Since now
the number of items and sellers is different in general, we use m to denote the number of sellers
and k for the number of items. The valuation wj of a seller j is now an additive function. We
reuse the following notation from Section 4: The allocation (Xall1 (v), . . . ,X
all
n (v)) returned by an
allocation algorithm A on input v returns an allocation of [k] to [n]. We let α ≥ 1 again denote
the approximation factor by which A approximates the social welfare. For XOS valuation vi and
bundle T ⊆ [k] we use a(vi, T, ·) to denote the corresponding additive function of vi for T . Also we
use the buyers’ social welfare contribution SWBℓ (v) for item ℓ ∈ [k] and buyers’ valuation profile
v, as defined in Section 4. We define furthermore the sellers’ social welfare contribution SWSℓ (w)
for item ℓ ∈ Ij and sellers’ valuation profile w as SW
S
ℓ (w) := wj({ℓ}). Due to the fact that for
j ∈ [m], wj is an additive function, there is no need for defining the notion of a corresponding
additive function for a seller.
Mechanism. We aim to design a BIC, interim IR, and SBB mechanism that approximates the
optimal social welfare within a constant. We propose the following mechanism, which we refer to
as Madd. We let Lj := {ℓ ∈ Ij : E[SW
B
ℓ (v)] ≥ 4E[SW
S
ℓ (w)]} and L¯j := Ij \ Lj for all j ∈ [m], and
we let L :=
⋃m
j=1 Lj and L¯ := [k] \ L denote the sets of high welfare items and low welfare items,
respectively. Our mechanism will only allow trading items in L, and define for ℓ ∈ L the item price
pℓ :=
1
2
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
,
similar to what we did for M1-supply.
An essential difference between Madd and M1-supply is that the order in which buyers and sellers
are processed is reversed. Mechanism Madd roughly works as follows. It first asks every buyer which
set of items it would like to receive from those items in L that have not been requested yet. Then
Madd offers every seller j ∈ [m] a payment in exchange for the subset of all items in Ij that have been
requested. This offer is made with a qj ensures that the requested items of seller j are transfered
to the buyers with probability 1/2. The items of the sellers accepting the offer are transferred to
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the buyers for the corresponding item prices. Buyers act strategically, and request a set of items
that maximizes their expected utility, knowing that the item sets requested from each seller will be
assigned to them with probability 1/213.
1. For ℓ ∈ [k], compute E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
and E
[
SW
S
ℓ (w)
]
.
2. For all j ∈ [m], compute Lj and qj .
3. Compute L, L¯.
4. Let Λ1 := L, Xi := ∅ for all i ∈ [n], and Yj := Ij for all j ∈ [m].
5. For each buyer i ∈ [n]:
(a) Ask buyer i to select an expected-maximising bundle Bi ⊆ Λi given the prices {pℓ : ℓ ∈ Λi} from the set
of available items (where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of both the mechanism
and the valuations).
(b) Update the set of available items Λi+1 := Λi \ Bi.
6. Let B :=
⋃n
i=1
Bi be the set of all items demanded by the buyers.
7. For each seller j ∈ [m]:
(a) Let Sj := B ∩ Lj be the set of items owned by seller j that are demanded.
(b) Let p(Sj) :=
∑
ℓ∈Sj
pℓ and let qj = 1/(2Pr [wj(Sj) ≤ p(Sj)]).
(c) With probability qj , offer payment p(Sj) in exchange for the bundle Sj . Otherwise, skip this seller.
(d) If the seller accepts the offer, allocate each items in Sj to the buyer that requested it (i.e., remove Sj from
Yj and add Sj ∩ Bi to Xi for all i ∈ [n])
8. Return the outcome consisting of allocation (X = (X1, . . . , Xn),Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk)) and payments ρ = (ρ
B,ρS),
where ρBi =
∑
ℓ∈Xi
pℓ for i ∈ [n] and ρ
S
j =
∑
ℓ∈Ij\Yj
−pℓ for j ∈ [m].
Example 5.1. There is 1 buyer and 2 unit-supply sellers. Each seller posses 1 item. The buyer has
two XOS valuation functions v1 and v2, each one is chosen with probability 0.5. v1 is composed by
3 additive functions a1, a2, and a3, i.e., v1(S) = max{a1(S), a2(S), a3(S)}. v2 is composed by the
only additive function a4. The additive functions are represented in the following table, recall that
an additive function is represented by a(S) =
∑
j∈S αj for all S ⊆ [k]. Each seller j has a valuation
function wj = 0, so we always want to reallocate items from sellers to the buyer.
Function item 1 (α1) item 2 (α2)
a1 0 4
a2 8 0
a3 7 2
a4 1 6
Now, we have to compute the prices that the mechanism has to post. Thus, we need the expected
contribution to the optimal social welfare of every item. First, notice that the optimum allocates
the items 1 and 2 to the buyer when her valuation is v1. In this case the contribution to the optimal
social welfare of items 1 is 7, and the contribution of item 2 is 2. Similarly, if the buyer has valuation
v2, the optimum still allocates items 1 and 2 to her, but in this case the contribution to the optimal
social welfare of item 1 is 1, and the contribution of item 2 is 6. Thus, the expected contribution of
every item to the optimal social welfare is 4, i.e., E[SWBj (v)] = 4 for all j = 1, 2. Since the price pj
of each item is defined to be half of the expected contribution to the optimal social welfare, pj = 2
for all the items.
13 The buyer may need to compute complicated expected values in order to establish which bundle is maximizing his
expected utility. But this depends on the query oracle model we assume to have. However, most importantly, the
focus of the paper is not on polynomial time implementability but on the existence of mechanisms that constantly
approximate the optimal social-welfare.
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Now the buyer has to compute the bundle that maximises her expected-utility given the posted
prices, and the fact that each seller is available with probability 0.5. First, consider the case when
the buyer has valuation v1. In this case the expected utility for the different bundles are:
u({1}) =
1
2
· (8 − 4) +
1
2
· 0 = 2
u({2}) =
1
2
· (4 − 4) +
1
2
· 0 = 0
u({1, 2}) =
1
4
· (8− 4) +
1
4
· (4− 4) +
1
4
· (9− 8) +
1
4
· 0 =
5
4
The utility-maximising bundle that will be requested by the buyer in case of v1 is {1}. Instead, if
the valuation of the buyer is v2, then the requested bundle will be {1, 2}.
This example shows that the buyers are committed to difficult computations in order to under-
stand which is the utility-maximising bundle. But, again, our goal is to understand the existence
of mechanisms that achieve a constant approximation to the optimum social welfare, even if they
are not computational efficient.
Theorem 5.1. The mechanism Madd is ex-interim IR, BIC, DSBB, and (2 + 4α)-approximates
the optimal social welfare.
By taking for A an optimal algorithm (i.e., α = 1), we obtain the existence of a mechanism that
is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB, and 6-approximates the optimal social welfare. However, if both a
polynomial time approximation algorithm A and an approximation for the query oracle exist, then
we get our mechanism to run in polynomial time.
Corollary 5.1. For the special case that for all i ∈ [n], distribution Gi is over additive valuation
functions, Madd is ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB and (2 + 4α)-approximates the optimal social welfare.
6 Discussion
An open problem is to extend or refine our mechanisms so that they satisfy the DSIC and ex-post
IR properties for the case of XOS buyers and additive sellers. The first naive approach for doing
so might be trying to consider every additive seller as a set of distinct unit-supply sellers and then
run M1-supply. However, this is not guaranteed to work due to the fact that the items placed in the
market by the seller influence the buyers’ decisions on their bundle choices. Something we might
additionally do is to ask every seller for her favourite bundle to place in the market, However, this
may cause a seller to regret having chosen that particular bundle after seeing the realizations of
the buyers’ valuations. On the other hand, it also seems highly challenging to establish any sort
of impossibility result for any reasonably defined class of posted price mechanisms for two-sided
markets.
Another natural challenge is to extend the above mechanism to the setting in which both buyers
and sellers possess an XOS valuation function over bundles of items. We suspect however that it
is impossible to devise a suitable mechanism that uses item-pricing (i.e., mechanisms that fix a
price vector offline and then request buyers or sellers one-by-one to specify their favorite item
bundle).The main reason for why this seems to be the case is that if a buyer (or a seller) is asked
to select a bundle of items B she desires the most, then it is impossible to guarantee that she
receives the complete bundle. Instead, she may receive a subset of it, and in turn she may regret
having chosen that bundle B and not another bundle B′ after having observed the realizations of
the sellers’ valuations.
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A An Initial Mechanism and Direct Trade Strong Budget Balance (Full
Details)
In [1], Blumrosen and Dobzinski present a mechanism for exchange markets with subadditive val-
uation functions. They prove the following for this mechanism, which we name Mbd.
Theorem A.1 (Blumrosen and Dobzinski [1]). Mechanism Mbd is a DSIC, WBB, ex-post
IR randomized direct revelation mechanism that 4H(s)-approximates the optimal social welfare
for combinatorial exchange markets (n, k, I,F ) with subadditive valuation functions, where s =
min{n, |Ii| : i ∈ [n]} is the minimum of the number of agents and the number of items in an agents
initial endowment, and H(·) denotes the harmonic numbers.
In particular, this mechanism gives us a constant approximation factor if the number of starting
items of the agents is bounded by a constant.
We show now how we can use this mechanism as a black box in order to obtain an SBB
mechanism with only a slightly worse approximation ratio. Define mechanism Msbb as follows.
When given as input a combinatorial exchange market C = (n, k, I,F ),
1. Select an agent in i ∈ [n] uniformly at random.
2. Run Mechanism Mbd on the combinatorial exchange market
C−i = ([n] \ {i}, I−i = (I1, . . . , Ii−1, Ii+1, . . . , In),F−i = (F1, . . . , Fi−1, Fi+1, . . . , Fn)).
Let (X−i,ρ−i) be the outcome that Mechanism Mbd outputs.
3. Set Xi = Ii and set pi = −
∑
j∈[n]\{i} pj . Output the allocation (Xi,X−i) and output payment
vector (pi,ρ−i).
So Mechanism Msbb essentially runs Mechanism Mbd where one random agent is removed from
the market. This agent receives the leftover money that Mechanism Mbd generates, and does not
receive or lose any items. The following is a direct corollary of the DSIC, WBB, and ex-post IR
properties of mechanism Mbd.
Theorem A.2. Mechanism Msbb is a DSIC, SBB, and ex-post IR mechanism for exchange markets
with subadditive valuation functions.
Secondly, the following theorem shows that the mechanism loses only a factor 2n/(n − 1) ≤ 3 in
the approximation ratio for n ≥ 3. (For n = 2 it is straightforward to come up with alternative
mechanisms that achieve a good approximation ratio.)
Theorem A.3. Mechanism Msbb achieves an 8nH(s)/(n− 1)-approximation to the optimal social
welfare for exchange markets with subadditive valuations and at least 3 agents.
Proof. Fix a valuation vector v of the agents, let X∗∗v ⊆ A be the social welfare maximising
allocation when the agents have valuations v. For an agent i ∈ [n], denote by X∗∗
v,−i the allocation
for C−i where (X
∗∗
v,−i)j = (X
∗∗
v )j \ Ii for j ∈ [n] \ {i}, i.e., the allocation obtained from X
∗∗
v when
i is removed, and all items of i are removed. Moreover let X∗
v,−i be the optimal allocation of the
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combinatorial exchange market C−i when the valuation function vector of the players [n] \ {i} is
fixed to v−i. Mechanism Msbb selects i uniformly at random, so by Theorem A.1, the expected
social welfare of Mechanism Msbb is at least
1
4H(s)
Ei

 ∑
j∈[n]\{i}
vj(X
∗
v,−i)

 ≥ 1
4H(s)
Ei

 ∑
j∈[n]\{i}
vj(X
∗∗
v,−i)


=
1
4nH(s)
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
vj((X
∗∗
v )j \ Ii)
=
1
4nH(s)
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
vi((X
∗∗
v )i \ Ij)
=
1
4nH(s)
∑
i∈[n]
∑
{j,j′}:j,j′∈[n]\{i}
∧j 6=j′
1
n− 2
(vi((X
∗∗
v )i \ Ij) + vi((X
∗∗
v )i \ Ij′))
≥
1
4nH(s)
∑
i∈[n]
∑
{j,j′}:j,j′∈[n]\{i}∧j 6=j′
1
n− 2
vi(X
∗∗
v )
=
1
4nH(s)
∑
i∈[n]
n− 1
2
vi(X
∗∗
v )
=
n− 1
8nH(s)
∑
i∈[n]
vi(X
∗∗
v ),
where the second inequality follows from subadditivity. This proves the claim, since the above holds
for every valuation vector v. ⊓⊔
This yields an ex-post IR, SBB, DSIC mechanism that O(1)-approximates the social welfare if the
number of items initially posessed by an agent is bounded by a constant.
The principle that we used to construct Mechanism Msbb can more generally be used to turn
any WBB mechanism into a SBB one, while preserving the DSIC and ex-post IR properties. This
principle also reveals a problematic aspect of the notion of SBB: it allows for agents to receive
money, while they are not involved in any trade. This motivates a strengthened notion of strong
budget balance, which we call direct trade strong budget balance.
Definition A.1. A mechanism for an exchange market satisfies direct trade strong budget balance
(DSBB) iff the outcome it generates can be achieved by a set of bilateral trades, where each trade
consists of a reallocation of an item from an agent i to an agent j, and a monetary transfer from
agent j to agent i. Moreover, each item may only be traded once.
It can be seen that Mechanism Msbb does not satisfy DSBB. In the remainder of the paper we will
proceed to design mechanisms for two-sided markets that do satisfy DSBB.14
B Proof of Theorem 4.1
We split the proof into two lemmas that bound the sellers’ and the buyers’ relative contributions
to the social welfare. We use the notation OPT as definied in Section 2, and we use ALG to
14 We note that the double auctions given in [5] also satisfy the DSBB property.
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denote the expected social welfare of the mechanism, i.e., Ev,w[SW(M1-supply(v,w))]. Moreover, the
superscripts S,B respectively denote the sellers’ and buyers’ contributions to the social welfare,
e.g., OPT = OPTS + OPTB and ALG = ALGS + ALGB . Recall that we use Xall(v) to denote the
allocation resulting from Algorithm A on buyers’ valuation vector v.
The following lemma is a simple consequence of the fact that M1-supply lets every seller in L
gets an offer and accepts it with probability exactly1/2.
Lemma B.1. If every seller j ∈ L puts her item into the market with probability exactly 1/2, then
2ALGS ≥
k∑
j=1
E [wj] ≥ OPT
S .
Proof. The second inequality is trivial, so we focus on the first inequality. First, observe that
Pr [wj > pj ] ≤ Pr [wj > 2E [wj ]] <
1
2
,
where the first inequality is because j ∈ L, and the second inequality is by Markov’s inequality.
Thus with probability at least 1/2 a seller j is happy to sell his item at price pj . But every seller
receives an offer from the mechanism with probability qj := 1/(2Pr[wj ≤ pj]), so every seller gets
an offer and accepts it with probability exactly 1/2. This implies that every j ∈ L contributes in
expectation at least a E [wj ] /2 to the social welfare, since with non negative probability the buyers
won’t buy the item j. Moreover, a seller in L¯ who never trades, so their full expected valuations
are contributed to the expected social welfare. ⊓⊔
Next, we prove a more difficult bound that relates ALGB and ALGS to OPTB .
Lemma B.2. The buyers’ contributions to the optimal social welfare is bounded by
4αALGB + 4αALGS ≥ OPTB.
Before proving Lemma B.2, we point out that Theorem 4.1 follows straightforwardly from it.
Proof (of Theorem 4.1). The bound on the approximation ratio follows from the sum of the in-
equalities of Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.2. Moreover, it is a dominant strategy for a seller to accept
if and only if the payment offered to her exceeds her valuation, and it is a dominant strategy for
a buyer to choose a utility-maximising bundle for the items and item prices offered to her. Thus,
when viewed as a direct revelation mechanism, M1-supply is DSIC. It is clear that participating in
the mechanism can never lead to a decrease in utility for both buyers and sellers, and therefore the
mechanism is also ex-post IR. Lastly, it is straightforward to see that the mechanism is DSBB, as
the definition of M1-supply which we gave in terms of sequential posted pricing naturally yields us
the required set of bilateral trades. ⊓⊔
So it remains to prove Lemma B.2. In order to do this, we first prove two propositions: one of them
bounds the expected sum of the buyers’ utilities, and one of them bounds the expected sum of
the buyers’ payments. In both propositions we only consider items in L Given a buyers’ valuation
profile v, let v<i = (v1, . . . , vi−1). Further, let Z be a random variable that denotes the sellers that
receive and accept an offer from the mechanism, i.e., the set Λ1 at step 5 of M1−supply. For i ∈ [n]
let Λi(v<i, Z) be the set Λi as given in the definition of M1-supply when the valuation profile of the
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buyers is v and Z are the sellers in the market. Note that this implies that Xi ⊆ Λi(v<i, Z) ⊆ Z.
Consequently, Λn+1(v, Z) is the subset of items for which the corresponding sellers have accepted
the offer made to them by the mechanism, but remain allocated to the corresponding seller after
execution.
Proposition B.1. The total expected utility of the buyers for the allocation returned by M1-supply
is bounded from below by
E

∑
i∈[n]
ui(M1-supply(v,w))

 ≥ 1
2
∑
j∈L
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z] pj.
(Note that the random variables in this expression are v,w, and the decisions of the mechanism to
make offers to the sellers in L.)
Proof. First, note that for each j ∈ L it holds that Pr[j ∈ Z] = 1/2. Recall that we defined
pj :=
1
2Ev[SW
B
j (v)]. Thus, observe that by definition of pj, SW
B
j (v), and the law of total probability,
it holds for all j ∈ L that
pj = Ev
[
SW
B
j (v)− pj
]
=
n∑
i=1
Ev
[
(SWBj (v)− pj)I
[
j ∈ Xalli (v)
]]
. (1)
Fix i ∈ [n], buyers’ valuation profile v, and set Z ⊆ L of sellers who accepted the mechanism’s
offer, and now consider the set Λi(v<i, Z) ⊆ L of available items that i can choose from. Buyer i
selects a bundle that maximizes her utility, i.e., that is in D(vi,p, Λi(v<i, Z)).
Now consider an additional randomly drawn profile of valuation functions v˜−i for all buyers
except i, that is independent of v. Consider the allocation Xalli (vi, v˜−i) be the allocation of buyer
i returned by A(vi, v˜−i). For i ∈ [n], consider the corresponding additive representative function
a(vi,X
all
i (vi, v˜−i), ·), such that a(vi,X
all
i (vi, v˜−i), {j}) = SW
B
j (vi, v˜−i). Let
Si(vi,v−i, v˜−i, Z) := X
all
i (vi, v˜−i) ∩ Λi(v<i, Z)
be the items in Xalli (vi, v˜−i) that buyer i may choose from under valuation profile v. As i chooses
a bundle Bi(v, Z) ∈ D(vi,p, Λi(v<i, Z)) that maximizes her utility, and Si(vi,v−i, v˜−i, Z) is in
Di(vi,p, Λi(v<i, Z)), it follows that i’s utility for Bi(v, Z) is at least the utility she would get for
choosing Si(vi,v−i, v˜−i, Z). That is, for all v and Z ⊆ L
vi(Bi(v, Z))−
∑
j∈Bi(v,Z)
pj ≥ Ev˜−i

vi(Si(vi,v−i, v˜−i, Z))− ∑
j∈Si(vi,v−i,v˜−i,Z)
pj


≥ Ev˜−i

 ∑
j∈Si(vi,v−i,v˜−i,Z)
(a(vi,X
all
i (vi, v˜−i), {j}) − pj)


= Ev˜−i

 ∑
j∈Si(vi,v−i,v˜−i,Z)
(SWBj (vi, v˜−i)− pj)

 ,
The second-to-last inequality follows from the definition of the corresponding additive function
a(vi,X
all
i (vi, v˜−i), ·).
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Now summing the above expression over all i ∈ [n] and taking the expectation over v and Z,
we get
Ev,Z

 n∑
i=1

vi(Bi(v, Z))− ∑
j∈Bi(v,Z)
pj



 ≥ Ev,v˜−i,Z

 n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(vi,v−i,v˜−i,Z)
(SWBj (vi, v˜−i)− pj)


= Ev,v˜−i,Z
[
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈L
(SWBj (vi, v˜−i)− pj)
·I
[
j ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i)
]
I [j ∈ Λi(v<i, Z)]
]
.
Note that we exploited the independence of the events (j ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i)) and (j ∈ Λi(v<i,z)).
Thus, switching the order of the sums and using linearity of expectation, we get that
Ev,Z

 n∑
i=1

vi(Bi(v, Z))− ∑
j∈Bi(v,Z)
pj




≥
∑
j∈L
n∑
i=1
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λi(v<i, Z)]Evi,v˜−i
[
(SWBj (vi, v˜−i)− pj)I
[
j ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i)
]]
≥
∑
j∈L
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z)]
n∑
i=1
Ev
[
(SWBj (v)− pj)I
[
j ∈ Xalli (v)
]]
=
∑
j∈L
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z)] pj
=
∑
j∈L
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z]Pr [j ∈ Z] pj
=
1
2
∑
j∈L
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z] pj.
For the last inequality, we used the fact that for any i ∈ [n] it holds that Prv [j ∈ Λi(v<i, Z)] ≥
Prv [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z)]. The first equality follows from (1). ⊓⊔
Proposition B.2. The expected sum of the payments charged by M1-supply to the buyers is equal
to
E

∑
i∈[n]
ρBi

 = 1
2
∑
j∈L
pjPrv,Z [j /∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z]
Proof. The revenue extracted by the mechanism, meaning the sum of the payments charged to the
buyers, is equal to∑
j∈L
pjPrv,Z [j /∈ Λn+1(v, Z) ∧ j ∈ Z] =
∑
j∈L
pjPrv,Z [j /∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z]Pr [j ∈ Z]
=
1
2
∑
j∈L
pjPrv,Z [j /∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z] .
⊓⊔
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We now prove Lemma B.2 using the above two propositions. Observe that the buyers’ contribu-
tion to the social welfare ALGB extracted by M1-supply is equal to the sum of all the buyers’ utilities
and all the buyers’ payments.
Proof (of Lemma B.2). As just observed above, from Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, we have
that
ALG
B = E

∑
i∈[n]
ui(M1-supply(v,w))

+∑
j∈L
pjPrv,Z [j /∈ Λn+1(v, Z) ∧ j ∈ Z]
≥
1
2
∑
j∈L
Prv,Z [j ∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z] pj +
1
2
∑
j∈L
pjPrv,Z [j /∈ Λn+1(v, Z) | j ∈ Z]
=
1
2
∑
j∈L
pj =
1
4
∑
j∈L
E
[
SW
B
j (v)
]
.
By definition of L¯, for each j ∈ L¯ it holds that 4E[wj ] > E[SW
B
j (v)]. Every item in L¯ stays
unsold so,
ALG
S ≥
∑
j∈L¯
E [wj ] >
1
4
∑
j∈L¯
E
[
SW
B
j (v)
]
.
Therefore,
ALG
B + ALGS ≥
1
4
k∑
j=1
E
[
SW
B
j (v)
]
.
Now recall that E[SWBj (v)] was defined by the allocation X
all(v), being the one returned by
Algorithm A. So,
1
4
k∑
j=1
E
[
SW
B
j (v)
]
=
1
4
n∑
i=1
Ev
[
vi(X
all
i (v))
]
≥
1
4α
OPT
B.
⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.1
Proposition C.1.
∑
ℓ∈L
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
+ 4
∑
ℓ∈L¯
E
[
SW
S
ℓ (w)
]
>
n∑
i=1
E
[
vi(X
all
i (v))
]
.
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Proof. Let a(vi,X
all
i (v), ·) be the representative additive function of vi for the bundleX
all
i (v). Then,
n∑
i=1
E
[
vi(X
all
i (v))
]
=
n∑
i=1
E

 ∑
ℓ∈Xalli (v)
a(vi,X
all
i (v), {ℓ})


=
n∑
i=1
k∑
ℓ=1
E
[
a(vi,X
all
i (v), {ℓ})I
[
ℓ ∈ Xalli (v)
]]
=
k∑
ℓ=1
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
=
∑
ℓ∈L
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
+
∑
ℓ∈L¯
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
<
∑
ℓ∈L
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
+ 4
∑
ℓ∈L¯
E
[
SW
S
ℓ (w)
]
.
The last inequality follows because
4
∑
ℓ∈L¯
E
[
SW
S
ℓ (w)
]
>
∑
ℓ∈L¯
E
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
,
by definition of L¯. ⊓⊔
Proposition C.2. Let v be a buyers’ valuation function profile and let (X ′1, . . . ,X
′
n) be any allo-
cation of items to the buyers, let X ′i,j := X
′
i ∩Lj be the set of items in L that are allocated to buyer
i ∈ [n] and belonged to seller j ∈ [m]. For each seller j ∈ [m], let zj ∈ {0, 1} be a Bernoulli random
variable such that E [zj] = 1/2. Let X
′′
i (z) :=
⋃
j∈[m]:zj=1
X ′i,j for all i ∈ [n]. Then, for all i ∈ [n] it
holds that
Ez
[
vi(X
′′
i (z))
]
≥
1
2
vi(X
′
i).
Moreover, given any vector p ∈ Rk of item prices, the inequality also holds on the utilities of the
buyers:
Ez

vi(X ′′i (z)) − ∑
ℓ∈X′′i (z)
pℓ

 ≥ 1
2

vi(X ′i)− ∑
ℓ∈X′i
pℓ

 .
Proof. For the first claim, first note that due to subadditivity
Ez
[
vi(X
′′
i (z))
]
≥ vi(X
′
i)− Ez

vi

 ⋃
j∈[m]:zj=0
X ′i,j



 .
Observe that
Ez
[
vi(X
′′
i (z))
]
= Ez

vi

 ⋃
j∈[m]:zj=1
X ′i,j



 = Ez

vi

 ⋃
j∈[m]:zj=0
X ′i,j



 ,
because the events zj = 0 and zj = 1 are equiprobable for all j ∈ [m]. Combining this with the
above inequality establishes the first claim.
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The second claim follows from the following derivation.
Ez

vi(X ′′i (z)) − ∑
ℓ∈X′′i (z)
pℓ

 = Ez [vi(X ′′i (z))]− Ez

 ∑
j∈[m]:zj=1
∑
ℓ∈X′i,j
pℓ


= Ez
[
vi(X
′′
i (z))
]
− Ez

 m∑
j=1

 ∑
ℓ∈X′
i,j
pℓ

 I [zj = 1]


= Ez
[
vi(X
′′
i (z))
]
−
m∑
j=1

 ∑
ℓ∈X′i,j
pℓ

Ez [I [zj = 1]]
= Ez
[
vi(X
′′
i (z))
]
−
∑
ℓ∈X′
i
pℓ
1
2
≥
1
2
vi(X
′
i)−
1
2
∑
ℓ∈X′i
pℓ
⊓⊔
Proposition C.3. Let j ∈ [m] be a seller. The probability that the mechanism Madd makes in Step
7c an offer to j that she accepts, is 1/2.
Proof. For every j ∈ [m] and ℓ ∈ Lj, it holds by definition of pℓ and Lj that pℓ ≥ 2E [wj({ℓ})].
From Markov’s inequality it follows that
Pr

wj(Sj) > ∑
ℓ∈Sj
pℓ

 ≤ Pr [wj(Sj) > 2E [wj(Sj)]] < 1
2
.
Thus, Pr
[
wj(Sj) ≤
∑
ℓ∈Sj
pℓ
]
≥ 1/2, meaning that j accepts the offer with probability at least 1/2,
in case she is made an offer. The mechanism makes the offer with probability qj, and
qjPr

wj(Sj) ≤ ∑
ℓ∈Sj
pℓ

 = 1/2.
⊓⊔
For i ∈ [n + 1] and valuation profile v, let v<i = (v1, . . . , vi−1) and let Λi(v<i) be the set Λi
defined in Step 5b, when Madd is run when the buyers in [i − 1] have valuation profile v<i. Given
this definition, the set Λn+1(v) are the items not requested by any buyer at the end of Step 5, when
the buyers’ valuation profile is v.
Lemma C.1. The expected total utility of the buyers is at least
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Prv[ℓ ∈ Λn+1(v)]pℓ.
Proof. First, let us consider a fixed buyer i ∈ [n] and a fixed buyers’ valuation profile v. Let
v˜−i be an independently sampled valuation profile for the buyers in [n] \ {i}, and consider the
bundle Xalli (vi, v˜−i) that A allocates to i when the valuation profile is (vi, v˜−i). Let X
L
i (v, v˜−i) =
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Xalli (vi, v˜−i)∩L∩Λi(v<i). Moreover, let z be a vector of m Bernoulli random variables with E [zj ] =
1/2 and define for a subset S(v) ⊆ Λiv the random variable S(v,z) =
⋃
j∈[m]:zj=1
(S ∩Lj). Partic-
ularly, from this definition we obtain the random variable Xi(v, v˜−i,z) =
⋃
j∈[m]:zj=1
(XLi (v, v˜−i)∩
Lj). Also, note that when the buyers’ valuations are v, the mechanism will let i choose to request a
bundle from the set Λi(v<i) with item prices p, the buyer maximizes her expected utility and will
therefore request the bundle Bi(v) that maximizes her expected utility which can be expressed as
Ez

vi(B(v,z)) − ∑
ℓ∈B(v,z)
pℓ

 ,
as by Propostion C.3 each sellers’ requested items will be allocated with probability 1/2, as reflected
by the Bernouilli variables z.
Since Bi(v) is an expected-utility-maximising bundle Xi,j(v, v˜−i,z) ⊆ Λi(v), it holds that
Ez

vi(B(v,z)) − ∑
ℓ∈B(v,z)
pℓ

 ≥ Ev˜−i,z

vi(Xi(v, v˜−i,z))− ∑
ℓ∈Xi(v,v˜−i,z)
pℓ


≥
1
2
Ev˜−i

vi(XLi (v, v˜−i))− ∑
ℓ∈XLi (v,v˜−i)
pℓ


≥
1
2
Ev˜−i

a(vi,Xalli (vi,v−i),XLi (v,v−i))− ∑
ℓ∈XLi (v,v˜−i)
pℓ


=
1
2
Ev˜−i

 ∑
ℓ∈XLi (v,v˜−i)
(SWBℓ (vi, v˜−i)− pℓ)

 .
where the second inequality follows from Proposition C.2, and the last inequality follows from the
definition of the additive representative function a(vi,X
all
i (vi, v˜−i, ·).
If we sum over all i ∈ [n] and take the expectation w.r.t. every vi, we obtain the following bound
on the total expected utility of the buyers.
Ev,z

 n∑
i=1
(vi(B(v,z)) −
∑
ℓ∈B(v,z)
pℓ)

 ≥ 1
2
Ev,v˜−i

 n∑
i=1
∑
ℓ∈XLi (v,v˜−i)
(SWBℓ (vi, v˜−i)− pℓ)


=
1
2
Ev,v˜−i
[
n∑
i=1
∑
ℓ∈L
(SWBℓ (vi, v˜−i)− pℓ)I
[
ℓ ∈ XLi (v, v˜−i)
]]
=
1
2
Ev,v˜−i
[
n∑
i=1
∑
ℓ∈L
(SWBℓ (vi, v˜−i)− pℓ)I
[
ℓ ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i)
]
I [ℓ ∈ Λi(v<i)]
]
=
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
n∑
i=1
Evi,v˜−i
[
(SWBℓ (vi, v˜−i)− pℓ)I
[
ℓ ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i)
]]
Ev−i [I [ℓ ∈ Λi(v<i)]] .
For the second-to-last equality, we exploited the independence of the events (ℓ ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i))
and (ℓ ∈ Λi(v<i)). Then, Ev−i [I [ℓ ∈ Λi(v<i)]] = Pr [ℓ ∈ Λi(v<i)] and since L = Λ1(v<1) ⊇ . . . ⊇
Λn+1(v), it holds that Pr [ℓ ∈ Λi(v<i)] ≥ Pr [ℓ ∈ Λn+1(v)]. So, we have that the above expression is
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at least
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Prv [ℓ ∈ Λn+1(v)]
n∑
i=1
Evi,v˜−i
[
(SWBℓ (vi, v˜−i)− pℓ)I
[
ℓ ∈ Xalli (vi, v˜−i)
]]
=
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Prv [ℓ ∈ Λn+1(v)]
n∑
i=1
Ev
[
(SWBℓ (v)− pℓ)I
[
ℓ ∈ Xalli (v)
]]
.
The equality follows from renaming the random variable vj := v˜j for all j 6= i Now observe that by
definition of the prices, pℓ =
∑n
i=1 Ev
[
(SWBℓ (v)− pℓ)I
[
ℓ ∈ Xalli (v)
]]
. Combining these derivations,
we obtain the desired bound on the expected utilities
Ev,z

 n∑
i=1
(vi(B(v,z)) −
∑
ℓ∈B(v,z)
pℓ)

 ≥ 1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Prv[ℓ ∈ Λn+1(v)]pℓ.
⊓⊔
Lemma C.2. The expected sum of payments made by the buyers is equal to
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Prv [ℓ /∈ Λn+1(v)] pℓ.
Proof. For j ∈ [m], let zj be the random (0, 1)-variable that indicates whether seller j has been
made an offer and accepted it in Step 7c of Mechanism Madd, so zj = 1 is a Bernouilli variable with
expected value 1/2. The expected sum of payments made by the buyers is then
m∑
j=1
∑
ℓ∈Lj
Pr [ℓ /∈ Λn+1(v) ∧ zj = 1] pℓ =
m∑
j=1
∑
ℓ∈Lj
Pr [ℓ /∈ Λn+1(v)]Pr [zj = 1] pℓ
=
1
2
m∑
j=1
∑
ℓ∈Lj
Pr [ℓ /∈ Λn+1(v)] pℓ
=
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr [ℓ /∈ Λn+1(v)] pℓ
The second equality holds by the independence of the two events. ⊓⊔
Lemma C.3.
ALG
B ≥
1
4
∑
ℓ∈L
Ev
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
.
Proof. The expected social welfare contribution of the buyers is equal to the sum of the expected
utilities and expected payments. By the above two lemmas, their sum is at least
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr [ℓ ∈ Λn+1(v)] pℓ +
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
Pr [ℓ /∈ Λn+1(v)] pℓ =
1
2
∑
ℓ∈L
pℓ =
1
4
∑
ℓ∈L
Ev
[
SW
B
ℓ (v)
]
,
by definition of pℓ. ⊓⊔
Lemma C.4.
4αALGB + 4αALGS ≥ OPTB.
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Proof. By the above lemma, 4ALGB ≥
∑
ℓ∈L Ev[SW
B
ℓ (v)]. Moreover, our mechanism leaves every
item ℓ ∈ L¯ with its seller, and so 4ALGS ≥ 4
∑
ℓ∈L¯ Ew[SW
S
ℓ (v)]. Therefore,
4ALGB + 4ALGS ≥
∑
ℓ∈L
EvSW
B
ℓ (v) + 4
∑
ℓ∈L¯
Ew[SW
S
ℓ (v)] ≥
n∑
i=1
Evvi(X
all
i (v)) ≥
1
α
OPT
B,
The second inequality holds by Proposition C.1, and the last inequality follows because we defined α
to be the approximation factor of algorithm A, which is the algorithm that we assumed to generate
allocation Xall(v).
⊓⊔
Lemma C.5.
2ALGS ≥ OPTS .
Proof. The only items that our mechanisms potentially reallocates are the ones belonging to L.
Every item in L¯ stays with its seller. For the items in L, the mechanism ensures every seller sells
her demanded bundle with probability exactly 1/2, so for each seller it holds that she retains her
full initial endowment with probability at least 1/2, which implies the claim. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 5.1). Every buyer chooses a bundle that maximizes her expected utility, so the
mechanism is ex-interim IR and BIC on the buyers’ side. On the sellers’ side, it is actually ex-post
IR and DSIC: the sellers solely have to decide between accepting or rejecting a single offer to receive
a proposed payment in exchange for a bundle of items, and it is clearly a dominant strategy to
accept if and only if such an exchange leads to an improvement in the seller’s utility. The fact that
the mechanism is DSBB follows from its definition, which makes clear that payments are defined
by the appropriate sequence of trades and payments from buyers to sellers. The approximation
guarantee follows by the sum of the inequalities of the above two lemmas. ⊓⊔
By taking for A an optimal algorithm (i.e., α = 1), we obtain the existence of a mechanism that is
ex-post IR, DSIC, DSBB, and 6-approximates the optimal social welfare. Again, one may also take
for A a polynomial time approximation algorithm in order to obtain a polynomial time mechanism.
Proof (of Corollary 5.1). If a buyer i ∈ [n] has an additive valuation function, it is a dominant
strategy to request the items in Λi(v<i)) for which it holds that vi({ℓ}) > pℓ. This follows from the
simple fact that by additivity, the utility that a player has for any bundle of items S can be written
as
∑
ℓ∈S vi({ℓ})−pℓ. Thus, for every item ℓ ∈ [k] that a buyer requests (recall that this item is then
allocated to her for price pℓ with probability 1/2), a term of (1/2)(vi({ℓ}) − pℓ) gets added to her
expected utility. So including ℓ in her requested bundle is profitable if and only if vi({ℓ})− pℓ ≥ 0.
Ex-post IR property is also satisfied by following this strategy. ⊓⊔
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